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Health Care Cost Controls

Beginning with this essay and continued in quickly upcoming NBHRC events, we shall unfold the essential answers toward both immediate and long term health care cost cutting.  We shall illustrate why our model offers to succeed where others have failed.  We are further dedicated to collective purchasing and pointing New Berlin employers toward specific pre-qualified program options.

Executive Brief: 

METS & Collective Purchasing

Multiple-Employer-Trusts (METS) have been illegal in Wisconsin for some time.  This is a situation that may well change in the near future.  It important to look at why they were made illegal in the first place, to help determine if they hold hope for the future. 

What is a MET?  Traditionally, a MET is a group of disparate companies that come together for the purpose of buying health care coverage.  The key is disparate.  These companies generally have little else in common.  METS can be fully-insured or can be self-funded.  Both models have operated in the past.  Their outcome didn’t depend on that factor. (METS share attributes with “association plans” and as a result, many of the comments that I share with respect to METS are also true for association-type plans.)

At the outset, METS look like a good idea on paper.  Bringing a group together often results in the ability to negotiate a deeper discount/better contract with the provider community (at least relative to what the individual components would otherwise pay).  It also offers opportunities to pool risk arguably providing a more stable risk environment (by spreading it over a larger group).  Presumably, a premium rate is set for the entire group based on the provider contracts and the general risk of the group.  Even at the outset, this means that some groups that may not have high-risk factors (or poor experience) will pay more to offset the poor risk (experience) in the group.  However, it may not be pronounced.  What happens over time is that the poor risk/experience segments from the good risk.  Those companies with good risk increasingly supplement premium cost to offset the poor risk of other groups (by design- an integral feature of insurance).  At a point in time, the “good risk” companies have options for other coverage that are less expensive; (the poor risk companies have few options and cannot leave the plan because they either can’t get written elsewhere, the premium increase to move to another plan isn’t tolerable or key high-risk individuals will be denied coverage).  Ultimately this “flight” to lower cost by the good risk companies creates adverse selection and the only companies remaining in the plan are those that can’t leave.  The premium becomes increasingly expensive (correlating to the risk and experience) and the MET fails.

Even if one were to buy into the MET theory, a substantial amount of the success hinges on the ability to collectively purchase health care at reduced rates.  I do not believe that is a valid conclusion.  For many years the market place has been involved in collective purchasing.  Although it was not thought of as such, Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), provided that service for the past twenty years.  Several of the local (statewide) PPOs represented more than $500 million in “buying power” to the market place; (today that has reached almost $1 billion in some instances).  At a point in time, they did command relatively better pricing than “retail”.  [In hindsight, it might be argued that the traditional broad-based PPO may have simply redefined what retail is in the market.] 

It might also be said that there is so very little actual retail care, (care being purchased without a contract/discount), that the care and pricing afforded to PPOs really is the prevailing rate- or retail, if you will.  Virtually no organizations or organizational structures have been proposed, to date that come close to the buying power assembled under the PPO banner.  It seems difficult to believe that the prevailing thought - more volume will drive better pricing/lower costs- can be a successful strategy. 

The remaining (and burning) question is – can something be done.  The resounding answer is yes- there are fundamental strategies that can (and are) lead(ing) to lower health care costs.  The NBHRC has been working to develop a variety of resources that are designed to impact on the current cost drivers in the health care system.  The NBHRC has initiated a Health Care Sub-Committee whose sole responsibility is to identify and deploy those resources to the consortium.  The strategies are designed to help you specifically understand each company’s unique health care risk and their attendant costs (over the next one to three years).  And, most importantly, how then to reduce/address those costs.  We do plan to use the Consortium’s “buying power” as leverage to achieve lower costs on various services directed toward the lowering of health care costs.  We will be featuring a variety of speakers over the next year to provide each organization with the opportunity to identify their needs and deploy strategies that will reduce health care costs and have a positive affect on additional areas of the business!

Led by Mr. Dirk Carson, the NBHRC Health Care Subcommittee shall be working diligently on behalf of New Berlin employers. 

 

 

 

  

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